The occupation of New York Harbor, and the capture of the city of New York were the most conspicuous British successes of the summer and fall of 1776 during the Revolutionary War. In June, Commodore Peter Parker (1721-1811) and General Henry Clinton (1730-1795) were meeting with defeat at the Battle of Sullivan’s Island at Charleston, SC, and Benedict Arnold was racing to construct a makeshift naval fleet to stall a British invasion from Canada on Lake Champlain.
At the same time, two brothers, General Sir William Howe (1729 –1814) and Commander-in-Chief of the North American Station, Richard Howe (later Earl Howe, 1726-1799), were arriving in New York Bay.
The Howes carried not only with the powers proper to the commanders of great fleets and armies, but also the authority of peace commissioners, to negotiate an amicable arrangement with the revolted Colonies, which were even then unsure about the declaring independence.
William Howe had awaited for some time at Halifax, Nova Scotia, for the arrival of expected reinforcements, but wearying at last he sailed on the 10th of June, 1776, with the army.
On the 25th he himself reached Sandy Hook, the entrance to New York Bay, having preceded the transports in a frigate. On the 29th, the day after Commodore Parker’s repulse at Fort Moultrie in South Carolina, the troops arrived at New York; and on July 3d, the date on which Benedict Arnold, retreating from Canada, reached Crown Point, the British landed on Staten Island, west side of the lower Bay.
On the 12th came in the Eagle, 64, carrying the flag of Richard Howe. He was much esteemed by the Americans for his own personal qualities, and for his attitude towards them in the present dispute, as well as for the memory of his brother Lord George Howe (1725-1758), who had endeared himself greatly to them in the campaign of 1758, when he had fallen at Ticonderoga in the Battle of Carillon.
The decisive step of declaring independence had been taken already however, on July 4th, eight days before the Richard Howe’s arrival. A month was spent in fruitless attempts to negotiate with the new government, without recognizing any official character in its representatives.
During that time, however, while abstaining from decisive operations, cruisers were kept at sea to intercept American traders, and the Admiral, immediately upon arriving, sent four vessels of war twenty-five miles up the Hudson River, as far as Tarrytown.
This squadron was commanded by Hyde Parker (1739-1807), afterwards, in 1801, Horatio Nelson’s cautious commander-in-chief at the Battle of Copenhagen. The trip up the Hudson was performed under a tremendous cannonade from all the batteries on both shores, but the ships could not be stopped.
Towards the middle of August it was evident that the Americans would not accept any terms in the power of the Howes to offer, and it became necessary to attempt to coerce the rebels by arms.
Taking the City of New York
In the taking of the city of New York in 1776 the British Navy provided a critical role as a the base of operations and line of communications.
The harbor of New York divides into two parts — the upper and lower Bays — connected by a passage called the Narrows, between Long Island and Staten Islands, upon the latter of which the British troops were encamped.
Long Island, which forms the eastern shore of the Narrows, extends to the east-north-east a hundred and ten miles, enclosing between itself and the continent a broad sheet of water called Long Island Sound, that reaches nearly to Narragansett Bay.
The latter, being a fine anchorage, entered also into the British scheme of operations, as an essential feature in a coastwise maritime campaign. Long Island Sound and the upper Bay of New York are connected by a crooked and difficult passage, known as the East River, eight or ten miles in length, and at that time nearly a mile wide abreast the city of New York.
At the point where the East River joins New York Bay, the Hudson or North River, an estuary there nearly two miles wide, also enters from the north. Near their confluence is Governor’s Island, half a mile below the Manhattan, centrally situated to command the entrances to both.
Between the East and North rivers, with their general directions from north and east-north-east, is a long strip of land gradually narrowing to the southward cut by the Harlem River — a narrow and partially navigable stream connecting the East and North rivers.
At the southern extreme is Manhattan Island, and at it’s southern extreme the city of New York, with about 20,000 to 25,000 inhabitants.
[When George Washington and the Continental Army arrived to defend the city in mid-April, panic ensued. Historians think about a third of the population fled the city, dropping the civilian population to 15,000 to 18,000.]
As both the East and North rivers were navigable for large ships, the former throughout, the Hudson for over a hundred miles above its mouth, it was evident that control of the waterways would play an important part of the vents that followed.
Defending the Heights of Brooklyn
With the limited force at Washington’s disposal, he had been unable to push the defenses of the city as far to the front as was desirable. The lower Bay was held by the British Navy, and Staten Island had been abandoned, necessarily, without resistance, thereby giving up the strong defensive position of the Narrows.
The lines were contracted to the immediate neighborhood of the city of New York itself. Small detached defensive works skirted the shores of Manhattan Island, and a line of redoubts extended across it, following the course of a small stream which then partly divided it, a mile from the southern end.
[In 1776, the urbanized portion of New York City occupied only the absolute southern tip of Manhattan Island (below modern-day Chambers Street). Just north of the city was the spring-fed Collect Pond from which two streams drained east toward the East River, and northwest through Lispenard’s Meadows to the Hudson River.]
[Together, this pond, marsh, and system of streams formed a natural watery barrier that effectively cut the island in half about a mile north of the city’s southern tip. The forces of General Charles Lee built a line of fortifications south of it to protect the city from a northern land invasion.]
[The western anchor of this line was Lispenard’s Redoubt (near modern Varick and Laight streets), and the eastern anchor was Bayard’s Hill Redoubt (near modern Grand and Centre streets).]
Governor’s Island was also occupied as an outpost. Of more intrinsic strength, but not at first important, were the fortifications on both sides of the Hudson River, from commanding heights eight miles above the city, to restrict the passage of ships.
The crucial weakness in this scheme of defense was that the shore of Long Island opposite the city was much higher than that of Manhattan. If this height were seized, the city, and all below it, became untenable. Here, therefore, was the key of the position and the chief station for the American troops.
For its protection a line of works was thrown up, the flanks of which rested upon Wallabout Bay and Gowanus Bay, two indentations in the shores of Long Island.
These fortifications Washington manned with 9,000 of the 18,000 men under his command. By the arrival of three divisions of Hessian troops, Howe’s army now numbered over 34,000 men, to which Clinton brought 3,000 from the Siege of Charleston.
On the 22d of August the British crossed from Staten Island to Gravesend Bay, on the Long Island shore of the Narrows. The Navy covered the landing, and the transportation of the troops was under the charge of Commodore William Hotham (1736–1813), who, nineteen years later, annoyed Horatio Nelson as his cautious commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean.
By noon 15,000 men and 40 field-guns had been carried over and placed on shore. The force of the Americans permitted little opposition to the British advance; but General Howe was cautious and easy-going, and it was not till the 27th that the army, now increased to 25,000, was fairly in front of the American lines, having killed, wounded, and taken about 1,500 men.
Hoping that Howe would be tempted to storm the position, Washington replaced these with 2,000 men drawn from his meager numbers; but Henry Clinton, who had a distinguished part at Bunker’s Hill, held back his troops, who were eager for the assault.
The Americans now stood with their backs to a swift tidal stream, nearly a mile wide, with only a feeble line of works between them and an enemy more than double their number.
The Continental Withdrawal to Manhattan
On the morning of the 27th, Sir Peter Parker, with a 64-gun ship, two 50’s, and two frigates, attempted to work up to New York, with a view of supporting the left flank of the army; but the wind came out from the north, and, the ebb-tide making, the ships got no nearer than three miles from the city.
Fortunately for the Americans, they either could not or would not go farther on the following two days. After dark of the 28th, Howe broke ground for regular approaches. Washington, seeing this, and knowing that there could be but one result to a siege under his condition of inferiority, resolved to withdraw.
During the night of the 29th 10,000 men silently quit their positions, embarked, and crossed to Manhattan Island, carrying with them all their belongings, arms, and ammunition.
The enemy’s trenches were but six hundred yards distant, yet no suspicion was aroused, nor did a single deserter give treacherous warning. The night was clear and moonlit, although a heavy fog towards daybreak prolonged the period of secrecy which shrouded the retreat.
When the fog rose, the last detachment was discovered crossing, but a few ineffectual cannon-shot were the only harassment experienced by the Americans in the course of this rapid and dexterous retirement. The garrison of Governor’s Island was withdrawn at the same time.
The unmolested use of the water, and the nautical skill of the fishermen who composed one of the American regiments, were essential to this escape; for admirable as the movement was in arrangement and execution, no word less strong than escape applies to it.
By it Washington rescued over half his army from sure destruction, and, not improbably, the cause of his people from immediate collapse.
The British Assault on Manhattan
An opportunity thus seized implies necessarily an opportunity lost on the other side. For that failure both army and navy must bear their share of the blame. It is obvious that when an enemy is greatly outnumbered his line of retreat should be watched.
This was the business of both commanders-in-chief, the execution of it being primarily the duty of the navy, as withdrawal from the American position could be only by water. It was a simple question of look-out, of detection, of prevention by that means.
To arrest the retreat sailing ships were inadequate, for they could not have remained at anchor under the guns of Manhattan Island, either by day or night; but a few boats with muffled oars could have watched, could have given the alarm, precipitating an attack by the army, and such a movement interrupted in mid-course brings irretrievable disaster.
Washington now withdrew the bulk of his force to the line of the Harlem River. On his right, south of that river and commanding the Hudson, was a fort called by his name (Fort Washington); opposite to it on the Jersey shore was Fort Lee. A garrison of 4,000 men occupied New York.
After amusing himself with some further peace negotiations, Howe determined to possess the city. As a diversion from the main effort, and to cover the crossing of the troops, two detachments of ships were ordered to pass the batteries on the Hudson and East rivers.
This was done on the 13th and the 15th of September. The East River division suffered severely, especially in spars and rigging; but the success of both, following upon that of Hyde Parker a few weeks earlier, in his expedition to Tarrytown, confirmed Washington in the opinion which he expressed five years later to de Grasse, that batteries alone could not stop ships having a fair wind.
On the 15th Howe’s army crossed under cover of Parker’s ships, Hotham again superintending the boat work. The Patriot garrison of New York slipped along the west shore of the island and joined the main body on the Harlem River.
Despite these various losses of position, important as they were, the American army continued to elude the British general, who apparently did not hold very strongly the opinion that the most decisive factor in war is the enemy’s organized force.
As control of the Hudson Valley, in connection with Lake Champlain, was, very properly, the chief object of the British government, Howe’s next aim was to loosen Washington’s grip on the peninsula north of the Harlem River.
The position seeming to him too strong for a front attack, he decided to strike for its left flank and rear by way of Long Island Sound. In this, which involved the passage of the tortuous and dangerous Hell Gate channel, with its swift conflicting currents, the Navy again bore an essential part.
The movement began on October 12th, the day after Benedict Arnold’s little fleet was defeated at Valcour Bay. It was a successful movement and Washington was obliged to let go the line of the Harlem, and change front to the left.
Patriot Withdrawal to New Jersey
As the result of the various movements and encounters of the two armies, Washington fell back across the Hudson River into New Jersey, ordering the evacuation of Fort Washington, and deciding his base in the Hudson Valley would be at Fortress West Point, 50 miles above New York.
To these decisions he was compelled by his inferiority in numbers, and also by the very isolated and hazardous situation in which he was operating, between two navigable waters, absolutely controlled by the enemy.
This conclusion was further forced upon him by another successful passage before the guns of Forts Washington and Lee by Hyde Parker, with three ships, on the 9th of October.
On this occasion the vessels, two of which were frigates of the heaviest class, suffered very severely, losing nine killed and eighteen wounded; but the menace to the communications of the Americans could not be disregarded, for their supplies came mostly from the west side of the Hudson River.
It was early in November that Washington crossed into New Jersey with 5,000 men; and soon afterwards he directed the remainder of his force to follow.
At that moment the blunder of one subordinate, and the disobedience of another, brought two serious blows. Fort Washington was not being evacuated as ordered, and Howe stormed it, capturing not only it but its garrison of 2,700 men; a very heavy loss to the Americans.
On the other hand, the most explicit orders failed to bring the officer left in command on the east side of the Hudson, General Charles Lee (1732-1782), to rejoin the commander-in-chief. This left Washington with only 6,000 men in New Jersey, 7,000 still in New York.
Under these conditions nothing remained but to put the Delaware River also between himself and the enemy. He therefore retreated rapidly through New Jersey, and on the 8th of December crossed into Pennsylvania with an army reduced to 3,000 by the expiration of enlistments.
The Americans on the east side of the Hudson, diminishing daily by the same cause, gradually worked its way to him; its commander luckily being captured on the road.
At the time it joined, a few battalions also arrived from Fort Ticonderoga, released by Guy Carleton‘s retirement down Lake Champlain after the defeat of Arnold’s little navy. Washington’s force on the west bank of the Delaware was thus increased to 6,000 men.
The Revolution Survives
In this series of operations, extending from August 22d to December 14th, when Howe went into winter-quarters in New Jersey, the British had met with no serious mishaps, beyond the inevitable losses undergone by the assailants of well-chosen positions.
Nevertheless, having in view the superiority of numbers, of equipment, and of discipline, and the command of the water, the mere existence of the enemy’s army as an organized body, its mere escape, deprives the campaign of the claim to be considered successful.
Within a month Washington would take the offensive, and recovered a great part of New Jersey.
A final achievement of the British campaign of 1776 was the occupation of Rhode Island and Narragansett Bay by a combined expedition, which left New York on the 1st of December, and on the 8th landed at Newport without opposition.
The naval force, consisting of five 50-gun ships and eight smaller vessels, was commanded by Peter Parker; the troops, 7,000 in number, by Henry Clinton.
The immediate effect was to close a haven of privateers, who centered in great numbers around an anchorage which flanked the route of all vessels bound from Europe to New York.
The position was abandoned somewhat precipitately three years later. Rodney then deplored its loss in the following terms:
“The evacuating Rhode Island was the most fatal measure that could possibly have been adopted. It gave up the best and noblest harbor in America, capable of containing the whole Navy of Britain, and where they could in all seasons lie in perfect security; and from whence squadrons, in forty-eight hours, could blockade the three capital cities of America; namely, Boston, New York, and Philadelphia.”
Read More About the Battle of Long Island
This essay is an excerpt from A.T. Mahan’s The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence (1913). It has been edited for clarity and annotated by John Warren.
Illustrations, from above: New York Harbor in 1793; British fleet arrives in New York Harbor July 1776; George Romney’s portrait of Captain, later Admiral, Sir Hyde Parker, ca. 1760 (National Trust); “A Map of the Harbour of New-York by Survey,” ca. 1784 (National Archives of the Netherlands); Map of Manhattan and the city of New York, 1776; Washington leading the retreat over the East River, August 29, 1776; Map of Harlem Heights; and Fort Constitution and West Point Fields of Fire from Bernard Romans, 1775.
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